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***ARMY review
completed***

21 May 1971


Mr. Jack L. Guthrie, Acting Chief
Office Management Division
Office of the Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20315

Dear Mr. Guthrie:

The attached five pages of notes received with your request, AGAR-S(9541) dated 23 February 1971, have been coordinated and reviewed.


The interested offices do not concur in your proposal and feel that the declassification and release of the information would not be in the best interest of the U. S. Government at this time. We recommend that the documents be referred to the Department of State for review and comment.

Sincerely,


CIA Records Administration Officer

Encl:

5 pages of notes as received

DDS/SSS/RAI  fms (21 May '71)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - addressee
- 1 - OSS File (RAB) ✓
- 1 - RAB Chrono

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25X1A

25X1A

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12 May 1971

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Declassification of OSS Documents

25X1A

1. I have recently replaced [REDACTED] who is [REDACTED] One of the items pending was your memo of 26 February 1971 concerning declassification of OSS documents by the Department of the Army.

25X1A

2. The attached two pages of comments by CS elements have just been received, and it appears that the interested elements do not concur in the declassification of the documents in question.

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary
Strategic Services Unit

Attachment, A/S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATINTL

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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26 February 1971

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Executive Secretary, SSU

SUBJECT : Declassification of OSS Documents

1. The Office of the Adjutant General proposes to declassify the attached five pages of notes taken by Professor Dennis E. Harris, an unofficial researcher granted access to classified Army records, from the Office of Strategic Services originated documents if there are no objections from this Agency.

2. May I have your concurrence and comments.

[REDACTED]
CIA Records Administration Officer

25X1A


Attachment:

5 pages of Notes (C)

AGAR-S (9541)

23 Feb 1971

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RAB

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26 February 1971

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]
Executive Secretary, SSS

12-4135, Hg

SUBJECT : Declassification of OSS Documents

1. The Office of the Adjutant General proposes to declassify the attached five pages of notes taken by Professor Dennis E. Harris, an unofficial researcher granted access to classified Army records, from the Office of Strategic Services originated documents if there are no objections from this Agency.

2. May I have your concurrence and comments.

25X1A

[REDACTED]
CIA Records Administration Officer

Attachment:

5 pages of Notes (C)

AGAR-5
23 Feb

DDS/SSS/RAB/[REDACTED] Ems (26 Feb '71)


Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - addressee
- 1 - RAB Subject ✓
- 1 - RAB Chrono

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26 FEB 1971

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

23 FEB 1971

AGAR-S (9541)

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Records Administration Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

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
[REDACTED]
Professor Dennis E. Harris, an unofficial researcher granted access to classified Army records, has taken a number of notes relating to his study, tentatively entitled "Diplomacy of the Second Front, 1941-1945." Among these notes are five pages reflecting information from or concerning the Office of Strategic Services found in the Army files. Copies of these pages are included.

This department has no objection to the declassification of these notes. Subject to your concurrence, we propose to declassify and release them to Professor Harris.

Your comments are requested.

Sincerely,

Inlosures
5 pages of notes (C)


JACK L. GUTHRIE
Acting Chief, Office Management Division,
TAGO

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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~~SECRET~~

CPD

Type of Document: Memorandum

File No. and Serial: 336 Sec (10 Aug 43) Case#11 10 Aug 43

From: Gen. A.C. Wedemeyer

G.C.M.

Subject: Manifesto to German People by the Moscow Nations Committee of Free Germany

If the aims of the COMMITTEE OF FREE GERMANY are realized, Russia will be in a favorable position to negotiate a separate peace with Germany. The U-S- and G-B- would then probably be confronted with two alternatives:

(1) Continuing the war against the Germans without the effective aid of Russia -- admittedly not a very promising prospect.

(2) Negotiating a peace with Germany -- which would be tantamount to defeat for us... It should be emphasized that when appropriate, the Soviet Government can disclaim any connection with this organization and its activities. The creation of this Committee has been so timed that current conditions and possible future developments enhance its chances of successfully appealing to the German masses. Such conditions include "the war weariness of both the Russian and German people," "the stalemate on the eastern front," "the series of set-backs experienced by the German armies," "the destruction of cities and industrial areas by the Allied Bomber Offensive," "abandonment by her Axis partner Italy," "continued reverses experienced by remaining ally, Japan," "defections among satellites," and "the internal dissatisfaction within Germany with the Hitler regime."

While I personally do not believe that the German people as a whole are ready to accept communism, it is not unreasonable to expect that they would accept the terms offered by the manifesto as a lesser evil than to continue the war and to risk the terrible implications of the unconditional surrender terms of the Allies.

/following from attached Office of Strategic Services Planning Group, Manifesto to German People by Moscow National Committee of Free Germany, dated 6 Aug 43

The manifesto seems to reflect confidence in Russia's military and political strength in the present situation and her determination to provoke at least a limited revolution in Germany before any peace negotiations. It could serve equally well as cover for a separate peace between the Soviet and a militarist regime in Germany or for a far-reaching program of eventual invasion and Bolshevization. On the other hand, the fact that the Soviet government has allowed the Free German Committee to be set up and has given it support in the Russian press without consulting the other United Nations does not necessarily mean that Russia is determined at all costs to continue a lone wolf policy in regard to Germany.

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/under heading Psychological Warfare Implications: From the Point of View of the United States and Great Britain/

While the manifesto is aimed primarily at the overthrow of the Hitler Government and at the building of a "strong democratic" Germany on the pattern of Soviet Russia, such action is to be attained under conditions opposed to the present views and pronouncements of the U-S- and G-B-, particularly those pertaining to an "unconditional surrender."

.... If Germany responds to the manifesto, Russia would be placed in a highly advantageous position relating to peace with Germany, ~~since~~....

...a communistic Germany, which would scarcely be acceptable to the U-S- and G-B-. Further, success of the manifesto might bring about a breakdown of resistance, in which event Russia, with forces on the field, would be in a position to arrange a peace and a German government to its liking.

The manifesto represents a major political move. It was probably timed with confidence to coincide with military developments on the Eastern Front and the increased air activity in the West. ...it is not out of the question for Germany to seek a way out of the war.

.... The possible dangers to our political and military strategy are such that a re-examination of our American political position ~~must~~ as it relates to the manifesto is indicated.

The action...creates a favorable opportunity for German psychological warfare to exploit political disunity among the Allies, to increase British and American suspicion of Russia and vice versa. Any premature or hasty steps on our part to protect ourselves against the possibly adverse consequences of Soviet policy might aggravate the situation and result finally in the failure or at least postponement of our main European war objective -- total victory over Germany.

/under Conclusions/

a. As an instrument of psychological warfare the manifesto may have great value in assisting in the overthrow of the Hitler Government. In view of this, nothing should be done to minimize this effect.

b. The manifesto may denote an indication to seek a separate peace with Germany.

c. Present Soviet policy towards post-war political development in Germany as reflected in the manifesto is dangerous in its implications in that it might result in a government opposed to the political and idealistic principles for which we are fighting. Our political position will be greatly enhanced as our military forces arrive on the continent of Europe.

d.

e. That if a joint Anglo-American-Soviet policy is not established, we must be prepared at the psychological time to present to Germany conditions which will offset the Russian proposals in the armistice and the peace.

The question may be posed: is the Soviet Union pursuing a policy (1) designed to reduce the enemy's will to resist; or (2) to combat suspected machinations for an Anglo-American-Vatican peace at the expense of legitimate Soviet participation in the peace settlement; or (3) is Stalin pursuing the Bolshevik doctrine of world revolution; or finally (4) has Russia reverted to her traditional imperialism? Also, may there not be a blend of two or more of these elements.

....

It would therefore seem clear that the setting up of the Free German Committee and the drafting of the manifesto was no sudden, spontaneous action, but was rather the result of long planning and careful timing. /cites Stalin's speech of 7 Nov 42; Rhineland Conference at the end of 1942; article "There is a Way Out" by Ernst Fischer, Daily Worker, 13 Dec 42 and "still other manifestations."

...complete political unity does not exist between the Soviet Union and the other United Nations. Indeed, Soviet mistrust of G-B- and the U-S- remains openly manifest. The Soviet Union has been opposing the independent war effort of Germany since the manifesto/... the U-S- and G-B- might find themselves unable effectively to intervene politically either in Germany, the Middle Zone (between Germany and Russia), or in Southeastern Europe. 22

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Notes taken from [redacted] CPD
 Type of [redacted] cable
 File No. and Serial: 381 Sec (16 Sep 43) Date: 16 September 1943
 From: Thos. T. Handy, Assist. Chief of Staff C.G., N.A.T.O.; C.G., U.S.A.F.M.E.
 Subject: Subversive Activities in the Balkans

/informs commanding generals that C.S.S. has been given permission to extend activities to include Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, provided these activities are coordinated with the British #1 SOE and permission to extend activities from Yugoslavia to Greece and Albania. However the activities have to be of such a character that ~~throughout~~ they involve no commitment on the part of the U.S. and are directed solely to assisting in the defeat of the Axis. Also notes that preference among resistance groups or prospective successor governments is to be only on a basis of willingness to cooperate and without regard to political programs or ideological differences. Also notes that the State Dept. has been requested that the USSR be informed of operations which are proposed to be undertaken.

~~Attached to [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]~~

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 interval; not
 automatically [redacted]

Don Gillis [redacted]

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6.
95 #1

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum
To: The President
From: Thos. T. Handy, Maj. Gen. A C/S
Subject: /proposed message from FDR to Churchill/
20 Oct 43
for General Marshall

Attached is a draft of a proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister. The only hope of getting action at once is to go to the top.

The guerillas are fighting each other in the Balkans. Also, as I understand it, the situation in this area is further complicated by rivalries and competition between our C.S.S., the British S.O.F., and similar Russian agencies. You know that the Russians are extremely touchy on any question affecting the Balkans and feel that they should have the say. It will be difficult enough to get our efforts and those of the British united. It probably will be impossible if we attempt to bring the Russians into the picture.

Another factor is the possibility of a major U-S- involvement in the Balkans if we take the lead in guerilla activities there. If General Donovan's activities ~~are~~ were successful, it would have an enormous popular appeal and we might be subjected to pressure from our own people to move forces into the Balkans. This is exactly what the P-M- has wanted right along.

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2-6

Engle S. H. Helbling

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95 21

CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION, W.D.

memorandum

CAD 014 Russia (11 Sept 43)

11 Sept 43

Charles P. Furnett, Jr., Lt. Col., JAGD, Chief, Military Govt. Branch

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION, Subject: OSS Report No. 1109, entitled "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy."

1. The report concludes that the Soviet Union may not collaborate with the Allies unless the latter recognize at least certain interests that the Soviet government considers basic: inviolability of its 1941 borders, the existence of friendly governments on its periphery, and a coordinate place in a three-power scheme of world control. In addition to these post-war guarantees, the Russians insist that the Allies open a "second front" in the near future.
2. Since the Soviet Union urges the Allies to invade the continent with a large military force, a force which could hardly fail to increase the influence of the Western powers, on the continent, and since the Soviet Union at the same time appeals for collaboration, it would hardly seem that the Soviet government is irrevocably committed to non-collaboration and to an attempt to extend its influence over all of Europe.
3. At the present time the Soviet government is carefully avoiding, or postponing, the choice between cooperation and independent action, pending a clearer indication by the Allies of their own intentions.

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5-26